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Б. Балеvский**ЭПИСТЕМОЛОГИЯ ПРОТИВ ЭКОНОМИКИ**

Аннотация: автор статьи рассматривает явления эпистемологии и экономики с точки зрения сравнительного анализа.

Ключевые слова: эпистемология, экономика, сравнительный анализ.

B. Balewski**EPISTEMOLOGY VS ECONOMY**

Abstract: the author of the article considers phenomena of epistemology and economy from the point of view of comparative analysis.

Keywords: epistemology, economy, comparative analysis.


Fin de siècle marked the beginning of the decline in the importance of epistemology in science. The development of, so called, philosophy unit did not last long, but those who beloved the knowledge were elaborating on the defined aspects of gnoseology for years.

Theory of knowledge as a separate branch of philosophy did not appear in modern philosophy until the second half of the 20th century. However, many theoretical aspects were discussed as early as Ancient Times and the Middle Ages.

In Ancient Times two notions to describe the knowledge were used: episteme and gnosis. Episteme meant the knowledge that was discursive demonstrative, confirmable and practically used. Gnosis, though, was understood as a priori knowledge, theoretical, speculative and of conceptual character.

All the philosophers who contemplated cognition were interested mainly in its three aspects including human's cognitive skills, questions about knowing the reality, the essence of the truth and genetic aspect of the sources of cognition.

Human's cognitive skills and the issue of knowing came down to both epistemological realism and epistemological idealism (Drawing 1.)



Drawing 1. Cognitive conceptions division

Source: self-study

Later, epistemological idealism used to be divided into epistemological immanent realism and epistemological transcendental realism. The supporters of the former outlined that «*there is no unintelligent substance that would be the foundation for an idea (...)*» such as color, shape and familiar qualities (Berkeley G., A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, part I, p. 7).

Epistemological transcendental idealists, on the other hand, outlined that the world of «things-in-themselves» is not available for human awareness and human adapts a recognized object to his reasoning – the subject of reasoning (I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason).

Especially the followers, conscious and unconscious promoters of Kant's Copernican Revolution in philosophy, were and still are the main representatives of cognitive subjectivism and strong opponents of the objectiveness of cognition.

In opposition to epistemological idealism stood all philosophers among the group of epistemological realists, according to whom a human being crosses the immanent or transcendental sphere and indeed, communicates with a transcendental reality. At the same time, they confirmed a common belief that people face something objective, not only their individual experiences or counteractions. Among the

philosophers who shared such vision were Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Francis Bacon and Holbach who represent different views on the nature of being.

Apart from the enthusiasts of subjectivism and objectivism among the philosophers, some agnostics and skeptics can be found. Skeptics denied the possibility of knowing since Pyrrhus of Epirus times. As a result of adopted meta-assumption, agnostics and skeptics stood beyond the discourse on the two further questions in epistemology. The discourse, though, was vivid between those who depended the existence of beauty and ugliness, wealth and poverty good and evil on the individual point of view and those who recognized the above qualities as universal goods.

The demarcation line between rationalists and empiricists did not always match the division into supporters of subjectivism and objectivism (compare e.g. Berkley). However, while the aspect of the possibility to «reflect reality in mind» and to reflect «what is», could be and still is of great importance for the development for science including economic research on the issue of unemployment, seeking for an optimal method of basing such method only on the mind as it was done by the representatives of the Austrian school or on experience as it was done and is still done by others, seems at this point to be irrelevant. Because, it is the mind and experience that suggest that when searching for «everything that points at the truth and leads to it», it would be perfect to make an effort and find relations between moderate rationalism and moderate empiricism. Unfortunately, the epistemological discourse did not go that far before the period of the decline of this philosophy.

Leonard Nelson's accusations of the petition principia fallacy in epistemology (1911) was only one of the causes of the crisis in gnoseology. Other factors that limited further development and led to almost complete elimination from philosophy were the development of the theory of knowledge (drawing 2), theory of discourse and philosophical hermeneutics [Otfried Ho, (2001), trans. J. Nowotnik (2004), p. 255], logic and modern psychology, including cognitive psychology earlier known as experimental [Gordon M., (1996), p. 140].

Critical explanation and the studies on the source and indirect cognition, based on reasoning that consists of several links, did not pose a threat to epistemological

research on the scope and way of knowing the truth. The research on the manner of cognition within the frames of cognitive psychology, which uses only about 64 notions (which is 13,19% of total number of notions used in Polish cognitive psychology) to describe cognition in resultative and feedback aspect between the result of cognition and the new process of cognition did not seem to a danger.


It is not the same as far as the competition between logic and philosophy of science, particularly critical rationalism is concerned. The philosophers of the second half of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century developed the inductive concept of science and the notion of induction itself by pointing out precognitive and theorygenic roles of observation that is free from prejudice and a product of inductive conclusions based on the results of observation that undergone empirical verification (Drawing 2).

Types of induction	Incomplete induction (enumerative induction /simply induction) is accepting a general accuracy on the basis of finite number of confirmations proving the occurrence of this accuracy . It is one of the basic tool in empirical sciences. Incomplete induction derives from an observation of a state number of objects, events and situations that belong to so called class (e.g. S class). By means of such observation it is valid to infer that some object belonging to class S have a P property. The reasoning is that is if some objects that belong to S class have a P property, all objects belonging to S class would have P properties. However, it takes only one object belonging to class S that does not possess property P to claim that the conclusion drawn as a result of induction is false. " Incomplete induction is a non-logical operation, a jump to chaos - the real world -to the feeling or questionable hypothesis with the actual relations connecting the set of variables we are interested in"
	Complete induction (enumerative complete induction or comprehensive induction) is reasoning in which a general truth is accepted on the basis of statements that confirm all possible examples of such truth.
	F. Becon's eliminative induction –portrays his limited variability of the world and leads to formulating a comprehensive list of mutually excluding hypotheses concerning a particular subject and eliminating those excluding on the basis of experiment. Within this type od induction it has been assumed that if the list of hypotheses is meticulously prepared, there must be the right hypothis among them.
	Statistical induction –a set of research methods, particularly the ways of reasoning used in statistics refering to bigger population on the basis of random sampling coming form this population
	Mathematical induction - a way of reasoning used to prove a given statement or mathematical formulae referring to all natural numbers
	Mill's eliminative induction - a method of searching for cause and effects between the phenomena. The process is initiated by an attempt to find all possible causes or effects of a given phenomenon. In order to distinguish the real causes and effects, Mill created five methods of induction. Among them are: direct method of agreement, method of difference, joint method of agreement and difference, method of residue, method of concomitant variations. The drawback of this type is the lack of possibility to isolate the factors that are taken into consideration

Drawing 2. Main types of inductive reasoning division

Source: self-study on the basis: [Bombik M. (1985), vol. 2, p. 23 eng Wielka Encyklopedia Powszechna PWN, (1965), vol. 5, p.31., Blaug M, (1992), p. 55]

Not until 20th century schools in philosophy was it possible for different conceptions of cognition to be developed. Apart from the development of scientism, other beliefs appeared and flourished such as logical empiricism (verificationism) that divided reality into synthetic and empirical truth, with the preference to the latter that can be empirically proved or refused [Willard van Orman Quine From a Logical Points of View, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1953, p. 20 and Willard van Orman Quine, Carnap and Logical Truth, Synthese, Dordrecht Holland, vol. XII, No 4, 1960, p.]. In addition, a model of hypnotic and deductive scientific explanation was constructed by C. Hempel and P. Oppenheim. The authors planned to construct hypotheses that would be deductively verifiable with reference to so called universal laws. At the same time, they allowed the possibility to check empirically the result of a deductive process.



Drawing 3. Characteristics of chosen schools of philosophy of science

Source: self-study on the basis of [Otfried, p. 246, p. 249 and p. 251] and [Blaug M. (1992) trans. Czarny B., (1995), p. 48–52]

Both logical empiricism and hypnotic and deductive model, were not and still are not free from a famous logic fallacy *post hoc, er o propter hoc* [Blaug M., (1992), p. 43].

Leaving behind a reasoning about the existence of cause and effect on the basis of random coexistence made the way to the conceptions of K. Popper and H. Albert's to appear [Blaug M. (1992), p. 48]

Though, a thorough analysis of methodological rules by K. Popper [Blaug M. (1992), p. 58] shows that what is crucial for the main area in philosophy of science is a set of research activities, so called «rejection criteria», which is the process of possible rejecting a theory itself. Nearly simultaneously, K. Popper believed that in a *low probability* theory may exist, waiting for the change of conditions in which the study was conducted and therefore their elimination in the future after another attempt to prove them. Both fundamental rules of critical realism show that falsificationism focused on non-truth supports it and enables the non-truth to exist, among the theories that have undergone severe criticism and with that part of reality that has not been systematized yet and therefore has not been subjected to falsificationism. For the economy and science that carry out the study on such reality, the coexistence contributes to preserving the criticism about the rationality of economy and its capacity for real prediction.


Probably, the limitations of falsificationism were a premise to the development of instrumentalism and rhetoric. Moreover, they contributed to the discoveries of research conceptions by T. Kuhn, I. Lakatos and began the P. Feyerabend's methodical anarchism [Balewski B., (2015 b), p. 87]

Instead, the limitations of the philosophy of science, as a branch focused on the aspects and sources of cognition, strengthen the status of logic in philosophical pursuit of exploring the cognition aspects and genetic aspect of the sources of cognition and the essence of the truth. But, logic is «a technique like mathematics, however logic (...) is not a part of philosophy» [B. Russell, (1948), p. 5].

Truth and falsehood are equivalent categories in logic. Such equal status contributed to a belief that science should recognize both truth and falsehood. Science

as an activity of recognizing falsehood just to show its existence, loses its fundamental character of prediction of postulated reality. It does even happen when recognized falsehood is used in prediction as an anti-aim for cognitive and non-cognitive human's activity because the one-sidedness of the results of cognition expected by society is being lost- free of the possibilities of manipulation and using in indoctrination processes.

That is why, logic, despite being a formal science, is definitely not a philosophical discipline. Theory of knowledge does constitute a part of philosophy.




Drawing 4. Relation between logic and epistemology.

Source: self-study

B. Russell seemed to notice this fact. Many a time did he contrast logic with epistemology (drawing 4), perceiving it as a branch of philosophy that is independent from logic and possess distinct focuses and he believed it is constituted to control the assumptions and methods of logic [Gordon M., (1966), p. 141]


Undoubtedly, it is the weakness of sciences that compete with epistemology that contributed to its revival in modern philosophy. The revival of epistemology, though, forms a premise to take advantage of its findings in the studies within different sciences.



Drawing 5. Modern conceptions in epistemology

Sources: self-study based on: Laurence Bonjour, *The Structure of Empirical Knowledge [Struktura wiedzy empirycznej]*, 1985) I Otfried Höffe, (2001), *Kleine Geschichte der Philosophie*, Verlag C.H. Beck, trans. J. Nowotniak (red.) (2004), *Mała historia filozofii*, PWN, Warszawa, p.255–257

Economy, particularly those areas which deal with complex socio-economic phenomena, has its place among obliged disciplines because of its predictive character to take advantage of the program of epistemic externalism or internalism and gnoseological complex theory and epistemological skepticism as well (drawing 5). What is important within those areas is to demarcate the unknown range (Drawing 6) and the scale of objective reflection of reality in thoughts.



Drawing 6. Characteristics of modern polemics and skepticism

Source; self-study on the basis of: Otfried Höffe, (2001), trans. J. Nowotniak (red.) (2004), *Mała historia filozofii*, p. 257

So far, in order to fit the modernistic vision of the organized world, the economic research did only strengthen the chaos by inventing new theories «*of high level of confirmation*» that later turned out to be non-scientific [Balewski B. (2015 b), p. 85; Blaug M. (1992), p. 63].

Despite being often subjected to falsification and quasi-verifying measures, they were mainly based on the perspective of the agent. In European and non-European practice, it led to the situation that subjectivism of some revolutionists or social and economic quasi-visioners was accepted by their followers and admirers as fundament for allegedly objective historic vision. The promoters of the beliefs that do not need justification have been and still are portraying the reality similarly to the later canvas of Claude Monet and sometimes do they implement the apotheosis of death as if taken from the Z. Beksiński's works [Balewski B. (2015 b), p. 85; Blaug M. (1992), p. 63]

Thus, it is essential to base a research method on epistemological complex theory before constructing research techniques. As the Author's research experiences show, it is of great importance to point the possibilities of multicontextual objective

and subjective cognition in order to broaden the knowledge on unemployment and unemployment counteracting. Subsequently, it is important to reduce the number of theories and develop a social discussion on metanarrative concerning the recognizes aspect.

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